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I : INTRODUCTION 
 
Giles Pearson identifies three considerations that have motivated the topic of his book: first, 
Aristotle’s views on desire have been neglected or misunderstood; secondly, they are central or 
relevant to his accounts of many other things; thirdly, desire remains a crucial concept within 
contemporary philosophy.  While the final two chapters open up wider perspectives, I think it 
fair to say that in general the first consideration is dominant.  What most attract his interest are 
cruces that are hard to resolve, and debatable attempts to resolve them.  This goes with some 
selectivity of focus.  He remarks (p. 203), ‘Aristotle identifies the orektikon [faculty of desire] as 
the part or capacity of us in virtue of which we are moved to intentional action’, citing De Anima 
III 9-10, and referring back to an earlier section (ch. 1, § 5) which was in fact largely given to a 
relatively minute discussion of how specifically desire relates to locomotion.  There is no 
discussion of how Aristotle’s failure ever to focus upon intention must affect his view of how 
desires issue in action.  Not very much can be said about choice [prohairesis], defined in the NE 
as ‘deliberative desire of things in one’s power’ (III 3, 1113a10-11), without a treatment of 
deliberation, though its relation to wish [boulēsis] is discussed judiciously (pp. 183-8).  The 
upshot is austere, but also heroic: it is precisely problems that attract Pearson, and in proportion 
to their intractability.  He will hold the attention of those to whom at least their context is 
familiar; others may wonder why we pay Aristotle so much attention, and may be advised to turn 
to authors who take wider views and pursue paths with less pitfalls. 
 Thus Pearson’s book will best suit those readers who are least easily persuaded; it will help 
them greatly in identifying problems, and selecting solutions.  He discusses what can count as an 
object of desire, how desire relates to the good, how Aristotle distinguishes three species of 
desire and how widely each species extends, how some desires count as rational while others do 
not, whether desires are explanatory of action, and whether the desires of a virtuous agent can 
stand in tension.  I shall raise some points arising with two of Aristotle’s species of orexis 
[desire], viz. epithumia [appetite], and boulēsis [commonly translated as ‘wish’], not in criticism 
of the book, but in order to exemplify how it will stimulate alternative responses. 
 
 
II : APPETITES AND THE GOOD 
 
Appetites are primarily directed at the physical pleasures of touch and taste that are the field of 
the virtue of temperance.  Yet the category is extended to take in desires for a wider range of 
bodily pleasures, and perhaps even for an indefinite range of higher activities – to the extent that 
these are pursued for the pleasure they bring.  One uncertainty, which has been much debated 
recently (with reference to Plato as much as to Aristotle), is whether even appetites pursue their 
objects under the guise of the good.  Aristotle makes a familiar contrast between wishes that aim 
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at the good (for references, see p. 140 n. 2), and appetites that aim at the pleasant (see p. 91 n.).  
And yet he also says things such as the following: (a) ‘the pleasant is an orekton [object of 
desire], for it is an apparent good’ (EE VII 2, 1235b26-7); (b) ‘the orekton is always either the 
good or the apparent good’ (DA III 10, 433a28-9); (c) ‘what is immediately pleasant appears 
both pleasant without qualification and good without qualification’ (DA III 433b8-9).   Pearson 
raises a difficulty for those who orient even appetite ultimately towards the good: Aristotle 
cannot make the good at once the object of all desire, and the distinguishing object of wish.  His 
preferred solution well focuses upon what we mean by ‘good’ (a question that has received too 
little attention in this context).  He proposes to distinguish a ‘narrow sense’ of ‘good’ that 
correlates it with wish, and a ‘broad sense’ that correlates it with desire of any kind, rational or 
non-rational (p. 71).  The narrow sense he links, with accidental inelegance, to ‘objects of serious 
concern’ that are ‘distinctively human concerns’ (p. 164); the broad sense applies to any natural 
object of human desire, including innocent pleasures pursued by appetite.  
This is an attractive solution, and merits attention; yet it faces the objection that Aristotle 
must then be read as switching senses without warning, on occasion even recurrently within a 
few lines (as at EE VII 2, 1235b18-30).  While no path here is without its puddles, this might 
lead one to look instead to remarks like this: ‘In most things the error [about the really fine or 
pleasant] seems to be due to pleasure; for it appears a good when it is not.  We therefore select 
the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil’ (NE III 4, 1113a33-b2).   As Pearson agrees 
(pp. 82-3), that identifies how judgement and wish become corrupted, and not how appetite is 
oriented by nature.  This may suggest, as an alternative to be explored, a series of glosses upon 
(a) to (c) that reserve an association with the good for wish.   
(a) comes immediately after the phrase ‘the object of desire and of wish’ (1235b25-6), 
where the kai is restrictive rather than conjunctive (as is idiomatic with kai as it isn’t with ‘and’), 
and so may be explaining why pleasure too becomes an object of wish.   
(b) and (c) both need to scrutinized within their context.  Take that of (b) first: 
 
nous does not appear to move without desire (for wish is a desire, and whenever a thing is moved in 
accordance with reasoning, it is moved also in accordance with wish), but desire also moves contrary 
to reasoning; for appetite is a form of desire.  nous is all correct; but desire and phantasia are correct 
or incorrect.  Therefore it is always the object of desire that moves, but this is either the good or the 
apparent good (433a22-9). 
 
(b) may mean that non-illusory pleasures that are natural objects of desire show up as being 
good, without implying that even appetite pursues them as good; for it may be that it is when an 
object of appetite becomes also an object of wish that it presents itself as an apparent good.  Now 
in context there is an obvious difficulty: when an appetite moves an agent to act contrary to 
reasoning, how can its object become an object of rational desire?  Yet there is a distinction to 
help us, not between things ‘good’ in different senses, but between what presents itself to wish as 
good (NE V 9, 1136b7-8) , and what presents itself to choice as best (cf. NE III 3, 1112b17).  We 
may take Aristotle to have in mind here appetites which have as their objects pleasures that are 
natural and even necessary (VII 4, 1147b23-4).  An agent who counts as acratic without 
qualification (haplōs, b32-3, 1148a10-11) pursues to excess things that, being naturally pleasant 
in themselves, remain good in a way even on occasions when they are not choiceworthy (since 
the context makes them excessive or inopportune).   Hence they can become objects of an idle 
wish even as they are rejected by the choice that derives from an end which is the object of a 
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practical wish that has generated deliberation concluding in a negative overall practical 
judgement.
1
 
 The context of (c) I quote with Irwin’s punctuation:2  
 
Desires arise that are contrary to one another, and this happens whenever the logos and appetites are 
contrary, and this arises with those who have a perception of time; for nous tells us to hold back on 
account of what will ensue later, while appetite tells us <to act> on account of what is immediate. 
(For what is immediately pleasant appears both pleasant without qualification and good without 
qualification, because of not seeing what will ensue later.) (433b5-10) 
 
It is crucial to hold these two sentences apart, since the first describes the general predicament of 
agents who have a perception of time that exposes them to mental conflict in cases when it 
extends well into the future, whereas the second describes the particular situation of agents who, 
being unable to look far into the future, are free of such conflict.  Pearson takes these agents to 
be lower animals who lack a perception of time; but how then can they have a conception of the 
‘absolutely pleasant’ and ‘absolutely good’ (which is how he translates the phrases)?  His answer 
has to treat the text rather freely: ‘What is immediately pleasant for these creatures has the force 
of something that would be absolutely pleasant and absolutely good for us’ (p. 74).  It seems to 
me easier to distinguish ‘have a perception of time’, which applies to all human beings, from ‘see 
what will ensue later’, which they are sometimes unable to do.  We can then understand that, 
when men are ignorant of long-term consequences, they tend to view what is immediately 
pleasant both as pleasant without qualification, and as good without qualification (which, as 
Irwin comments, is an additional error), and hence to choose it erroneously as best in context, 
because they fail to predict its later costs.  If this is right, Aristotle’s concern here is with a 
distortion of judgement and motivation by human fallibility. 
 All I would conclude is this: the interpreter may have alternatives. 
 
 
III : THE RATIONALITY OF WISHES 
 
Wishes are in a way a wide category.  Their objects can be the ends that generate a search for 
means that terminates in making a choice (prohairesis).  They can also be things that be outside 
one’s control (as that a particular athlete or actor should win the prize), or even humanly 
impossible (as that one should live forever).
3
  Wish is distinguished from both appetite and anger 
(thumos) by being a rational desire.  But what does this mean?  One possibility is that desires are 
rational, just like actions (cf. NE III 1, 1111a33-b1), if they arise out of reasoning.  Pearson 
argues against this that appetites, and other desires classified as ‘non-rational’, can, on occasion, 
                                                 
1
 This seems to me clearly the right thing to say of a pleasure that is inopportune; cf. my Virtue and Reason in Plato 
and Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), p. 51 n. 28.  I concede that it is more questionable of a pleasure, 
however natural in kind, that is excessive; however, the agent may idly wish to pursue it without excess.  An 
alternative proposal, to the same general effect, is that such an object appears good to the agent’s rational part 
without his holding it to be good; so Ben Morison within his notice of Jessica Moss’s Aristotle on the Apparent 
Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ‘Book Notes: Aristotle’, Phronesis 58 (2013), pp. 307-8 of 301-18. 
2
 See his Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 366 with pp. 597-8 n. 20. 
3
 However – as Pearson also notes (p. 5) – the standard translation of boulēsis as ‘wish’ is unhappy in many respects, 
of which these are two: the term boulēsis is never applied to wishing that something had happened; and the 
possibility of idle desires serves in the Ethics to distinguish boulēseis from choices, and not from appetites or other 
irrational desires, which may equally be idle. 
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be prompted by reasoning also.  He also notes, though very briefly and in a footnote (p. 185 n.), 
that wishes can relate to goals that are basic and not derived, and that they are crucial in 
prompting deliberation.  Instead, he proposes that ‘a desire is rational if grasping its object 
requires one to be a rational creature’ (p. 190).  This faces the obvious objection that appetites 
can take on highly sophisticated objects (such as a particular variety of wine, p. 191), and anger 
can arise from the sophisticated perception of a slight.  Pearson’s response is that what counts 
here is ‘not the specific content or particular object of the desire’, but ‘the general or basic end of 
the desire’ (p. 192), which it shares with all desires of the same type.  The basic ends of appetite 
and anger – pleasure and retaliation – are accessible to the lower animals, but not the good, in the 
narrow sense, that is the distinguishing end of wish.  This may seem artificial, and yet Pearson 
very nicely compares how, within the function argument of NE I 7, Aristotle rules out perception 
as an element within the human good on the ground that we share it generically with the lower 
animals, even though many human perceptions (notably of incidental objects, such as ‘son of 
Diares’, DA II 6, 418a21) may be distinctively human.  And yet Aristotle can also observe that 
both parts of the human soul to which he assigns desires are distinctively human (EE II 1, 
1219b37-8), though he counts one of them as non-rational (e.g., 1220a10).  So it may matter for 
him that appetite and anger as general types of response are shared with the lower animals; and 
yet his classification of them as non-rational will be better grounded if he can appeal to more 
than that thought. 
 Perhaps one should return to a familiar Aristotelian thesis: in the Rhetoric (I 10, 1369a2-4), 
he associates the notion of ‘rational desire’ with the fact (also stated at NE V 9, 1136b7-8) that 
one can wish for a thing only if one thinks it to be good.  Now the relation between pathē and 
beliefs is debated.  Some even hold that pathē depend upon perception and imagination, and only 
contingently and indirectly upon belief.  That seems to me overstated: Aristotle’s account of 
pathē in Rhet. II is full of references to associated beliefs, and never seems to envisage that, for 
instance, one man could be genuinely angry without thinking that he had been slighted.  
However, the statement that I cannot wish for a thing without thinking it good is not paralleled 
by any statement that I cannot have an appetite for a thing without thinking it pleasant, or be 
angry with a man without thinking that it is incumbent on me to put up a fight (cf. NE VII 6, 
1148a32-b1).  Rather, just as the sun may look a foot across even to a man who knows its real 
size (DA III 3, 428b3-4), so a man may feel an appetite for what he knows not really to be 
appetizing, or suffer a fit of anger even when he knows that it is unmerited.  Aristotle associates 
all desires with evaluations of one kind or another, but he never requires evaluative belief for 
appetite or anger as he does for wish. 
 It would further seem that, even if we admit a broad sense of ‘good’ that wish attaches to its 
own good, and appetite to pleasure, this fails to constitute a new target in either case.  Aristotle 
must have in mind not only that a man never wishes for what he doesn’t think good, but that, 
when he wishes for a thing, this is because he thinks it good.  Analogous in the case of appetite 
would be that, when he has an appetite for a thing, this is because he imagines it as pleasant.  
Now how are we to think of ‘good’ in the broad sense?  Does it connote what is generic as 
opposed to what is specific, or what is determinable as opposed to what is (relatively) 
determinate?  Aristotle’s anti-Platonic remarks about the semantics of ‘good’ (NE I 6, 1096b21-
9) would appear to exclude the first.  So it would seem that, if appetite conceives of its object as 
good, this adds no further goal to its conceiving it as pleasant.  Equally if wish conceives of its 
object as determinably good, this adds no further goal to its conceiving it as determinately good. 
This makes a vacuity of the thesis that there is a broad sense of ‘good’ that both wish and 
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appetite apply to their distinctive objects (though the thesis might still be needed simply as a way 
of accommodating certain Aristotelian texts).  Thus the alleged ‘good’ of appetite differs from 
the familiar ‘good’ of wish in being not motivating but idle.  Which could further indicate that 
wish is more rational than appetite. 
   What else might we say to privilege wish?  One possibility is to relate a man’s wishes to his 
conception of eudaimonia.  This may be implausible of idle wishes (though Pearson tries to 
make it less so), but true of wishes of a kind to motivate deliberation for the sake of choice.  For 
there is explicit evidence (though the matter is debated) that all actions – but deliberate actions 
must be meant – aim ultimately at eudaimonia (e.g., NE I 12, 1102a2-3), which is also the final 
goal of choice (VI 2, 1139b3-5).  Choice has a double object, being of this and for the sake of 
that (EE II 1, 1227b36-7): an act is chosen for the sake of an end that is the object of a practical 
wish.  Thus eudaimonia becomes the ultimate end of Aristotelian wishes (other than idle), 
choices, and actions (if chosen).  This could then help, within practical contexts, to clarify 
Pearson’s proposal that wishes aim at the good in a narrow sense that connotes ‘serious’ and 
‘distinctively human’ concerns (p. 164).  However, Pearson is himself resistant.  He recognizes 
that the role of eudaimonia in guiding choice and action can be variously conceived.  On one 
view, which Broadie labels the ‘Grand End’ view, the agent consciously regulates how he acts 
according to a blueprint of the good life.  Pearson finds that tending to absurdity (p. 153).  On 
another view, of which we meet variants in Broadie and McDowell, the agent has an implicit 
conception of eudaimonia that is embodied in his choices and actions.  At least if he has a fixed 
character, there will be a pattern to his preferences that makes his life of a piece; and Aristotle 
may have this in mind when he equates eudaimonia not just with acting, but with living, well.  
He will then select options not just in a patterned way, but with a concern to live a life that he 
can stand by and answer for.  He will thus have a conception of eudaimonia that is not idle, even 
if it is in many ways inarticulate. 
 Why does this fail to satisfy Pearson?  He gives several grounds, of which all deserve 
attention, but none, to my mind, is cogent.  The most substantial arises out of his own form of 
words: ‘On this view, boulēseis need not make direct reference to the agent’s conception of 
eudaimonia – indeed, they can have any number of specific ends – just so long as they reflect 
that conception, that is, flow or stem from it in some way’ (pp. 143-4).  He rightly objects to this 
that if, as is required for full virtue in contrast to self-control, non-rational desires ‘obey’ and 
‘harmonize with’ reason (NE I 13), they too will ‘flow or stem from’ such a conception – and we 
are no closer to identifying what makes wishes distinctively rational.  However, the wording is 
Pearson’s own, and his reasoning arguably misdirected.  He had earlier written more felicitously 
of how choices and actions that display a character ‘amount’, when taken together, ‘to a more or 
less coherent conception of eudaimonia’, even in the absence of ‘any explicit grasp of that 
conception’ (p. 142).  Now amounting to is surely a closer relation than reflecting (or flowing or 
stemming from).  Pearson lists alongside choosing and acting undergoing certain emotional 
states, viz. pathē, as if in anticipation of his later argument.  Yet that seems out of place, for 
pathē do not help to make up a conception of eudaimonia, even when they fall into line behind 
one.
4
  How an agent wishes (non-idly), chooses, and acts goes to constitute his conception of 
how to live.  What Aristotle counts as rational desires, whether they be wishes or choices, are 
thus privileged by their internal relation to a conception of eudaimonia.  This seems to me a 
                                                 
4
 It is irrelevant to this point that an agent who does the right thing conflictedly cannot count as acting well, since his 
action is impeded. 
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promising way of fleshing out at once their rationality, and their relation to significant, and 
distinctively human, concerns. 
 
 
IV : CONCLUSION 
 
Such comments should not be interpreted as reservations about Pearson’s intelligent and tireless 
book; rather, they are illustrations of the impact that it deserves to have within, perhaps, a fairly 
narrow circle of readers.
5
  It more than earns its place even among the continuing plethora of 
treatments of Aristotle’s ethics and moral psychology.  Others may agree with its conclusions 
more or less than I; no one who is ready to read it should fail to benefit greatly from the 
experience. 
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 This review has been greatly assisted by comments made by Pearson upon a sequence of drafts; where he and I still 
diverge, it is in opinion, and (I know in my own case) without confidence. 
